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ABSTRACT
The Port of Antwerp is the second largest harbor in Europe. Security and policing activities within the 
port area are frequent, diversifi ed and involve many different actors (federal and local goverments, 
law enforcement agencies, emergency services etc.). To make security measures work, it is not only 
important that responsibilities and competences of these actors are unambiguously fi xed but also that 
there is suffi cient cooperation and coordination among them. In this article we extensively analyze 
existing policy arrangements within the Port of Antwerp region for four security phenomena, that is, 
port-related crime, threats, emergency situations and events and incidents. To this end, we developed an 
innovative assessment scheme to analyze and evaluate multi-actor collaborations. Based on extensive 
in-depth interviewing and actors’ perceptions and points of consideration, in combination with state-of-
the-art insights described in literature, we formulate recommendations on how to improve the present 
security arrangements situation, within current limitations (short-term), as well as thinking out of the 
box (long-term).
Keywords: Port security, qualitative research, emergency management, crime investigation, threat 
assessment, event management, policing.
1 INTRODUCTION
The current port area of Antwerp is one of the vastest harbor areas worldwide. It has a surface 
area of 13,057 hectares. In the area, some 409 kilometers of roads, 1,061 kilometers of rail-
ways, 350 kilometers of pipelines and 157 kilometers of quays are situated. Some 150,000 
people work in the harbor area, and some 900 private companies are active in the area. In 
2011, 15,240 sea vessels visited the Port of Antwerp, and 187,151,714 metric tons of cargo 
was loaded and unloaded.
This brief overview of some of the harbor area’s characteristics illustrates the importance 
of security within this area. Security in an international port such as that of Antwerp incorpo-
rates different elements. Harbor security on the one hand indicates harbor-related criminal 
acts such as international drug traffi c, smuggling, scam with vehicles and waste, etc. On the 
other hand, harbor security is also linked with protecting the port against economic and 
human threats such as terrorist attacks. Harbor security also involves preventing and manag-
ing emergency situations and incidents, as well as the planning and organization of events. In 
fact, every one of the four mentioned phenomena (that is, (i) port-related crime, (ii) threats, 
(iii) emergency situations, and (iv) events and incidents) is very important with respect to 
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harbor security and requires attention in our study. It is obvious that the four mentioned secu-
rity phenomena do not form completely mutually exclusive classes and that they in fact all 
overlap at some level and/or to some extent/degree with respect to security activities. This has 
no impact on our study results, since we look at the single phenomena from a multi-actor 
perspective.
From a socio-economic perspective, the Antwerp harbor area can be considered as one 
territorial region. Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictional lines are present within the area. 
The river Scheldt separates the area not only into a left bank and a right bank but also into two 
distinct administrative and judicial parts. The fi rst administrative part concerns Antwerp, 
whereas the second administrative part concerns Eastern-Flanders. The port of Antwerp is 
located not only in two Belgian provinces (Antwerp and Eastern-Flanders) and in three 
municipalities (Antwerp, Zwijndrecht and Beveren) but also in two judicial districts ( Antwerp 
and Dendermonde). Evidently, the possible problems in a large port area may not always be 
restricted to one municipality, one province or one judicial district. Moreover, the port area is 
still expanding on the left bank, and thus current problems may be relocated and/or extended. 
Hence, there seems to be a need for a cross-jurisdictional security approach in the harbor area.
As a result of the multi-faceted nature of harbor security and the administrative and  judicial 
complexity of the port area, a considerable number of ‘actors’ can be identifi ed. Within the 
port of Antwerp, the actors involved with harbor security can roughly be classifi ed into three 
broad categories:
 (i) Governmental bodies that have people in different departments who may deal with 
 security. They can be listed as the Belgian Ministry of Home Affairs, the Belgian 
 Ministry of Justice, the Flemish regional government, the governors of the provinces of 
Antwerp and Eastern-Flanders, the mayors of the city of Antwerp and the municipali-
ties of Zwijndrecht and Beveren and the municipal port authority of Antwerp.
 (ii) Those involved with – and responsible for – security from a justice and policing 
 perspective. The Belgian police is organized at two levels: federal and local. In the 
port of Antwerp, three local police forces (Antwerp, Zwijndrecht and Beveren) and 
fi ve federal policing bodies (the federal judicial police of Antwerp and Dendermonde, 
the federal administrative police of Antwerp and Dendermonde and the federal mari-
time police) are operational. Judicial authorities include the public prosecutors of the 
judicial districts of Antwerp and Dendermonde. Finally, the Belgian intelligence and 
security services can also be included in this category.
 (iii) Those involved with – and responsible for – security from an inspection and rescue 
viewpoint. These include, among others, the Customs, the Environmental Inspection, 
and the fi re brigades.
Moreover, within a port area, a large number of private companies also have to be taken 
into account for several reasons. The ISPS Code obliges those companies with a quay to have 
stringent security measures in place. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
(ISPS Code) is a set of international mandatory regulations that were developed to enhance 
the security of ships and port facilities. The rules were created in response to the perceived 
threats to ships and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. 
The Code gives the owners and crew of ships and operators of port facilities a constant risk 
management responsibility. ISPS went into effect on July 1st 2004.
This paper reports the results of a qualitative case study examining current security 
arrangements in the port of Antwerp and the actors’ perceptions of this current situation. 
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Taking a ‘public policy perspective’, we predominantly focus on (i) division of responsibili-
ties and competences and (ii) cooperation and coordination between different state actors. 
The aim of this study was two sided. First, the goal was to obtain more insight into the ways 
the four above-mentioned security phenomena (port-related crime, threats, emergency situa-
tions and events and incidents) are currently being approached in the port area. The study 
secondly aimed to perform a gap analysis based on the insights and perceptions of the differ-
ent actors involved in port security. The objective of this gap analysis was to identify the weak 
and strong points of the current harbor security setting. More specifi cally, the extent to which 
the policies (strategic level) and practices (operational level) of the different actors are suffi -
ciently integral and integrated were focused upon. This gap analysis allows us to make 
recommendations for further improving the port’s security arrangements.
In section 2, we describe the theoretical framework that we conceptualized to evaluate the 
existing level of integration and integrality of different security arrangements within the port 
area. Section 3 thereafter provides the research methodology and detailed information on the 
data and the methodology used. Section 4 presents the research results per security phenom-
enon and discusses these. We draft conclusions in the fi nal section.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY INTEGRAL AND INTEGRATED 
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
In this research, integral indicates ‘comprehensive’ or ‘global’. More specifi cally, approach-
ing security phenomena in an integral way means that attention is not only given to reactive 
processes (taking measures to respond to security problems when they occur) but also to 
proactive processes (identifying and taking into account security problems that might occur 
in the future), preventive processes (taking measures to prevent already identifi ed security 
problems from occurring), preparatory processes (taking measures to ensure suffi cient prepa-
ration to deal with security problems in case they occur) and recovery processes (taking 
measures that lead to recovery from the consequences of problems and a return to the ‘ normal’ 
situation). The distinction between these processes is based on the so-called ‘safety chain 
approach’ that was developed in 1993 in the Netherlands to evaluate risk policy for chemical 
industries and fi re safety [1]. An integrated approach exists when there is a suffi cient amount 
of coordination between the policies and/or practices of different actors involved in the 
above-mentioned processes, both at operational (short-term and hands-on) and strategic 
(long-term and policy-oriented) level.
Several issues need to be addressed when elaborating and implementing an integral and 
integrated security approach where many actors are involved. According to their position on 
two principal axes – the ‘strategic level’ versus the ‘operational level’ and ‘actor’ (integrated) 
versus ‘process’ (integral) – we distinguish between the following four issues (see Fig. 1): (I) 
the defi nition problem, (II) the communication problem, (III) the responsibility problem, and 
(IV) the handling problem.
To analyze and to evaluate multi-actor collaborations, the four areas of Fig. 1 need to be 
investigated and, where possible, optimized. These four possible problem areas are briefl y 
discussed hereunder.
 I. Defi nition problem: strategic decisions at actor level
 Defi ning the problem is widely seen as the necessary fi rst step in the policy process [2]. 
To be able to attain an integrated approach of security phenomena, it is essential that 
there is a suffi cient degree of consensus between actors about what constitutes a secu-
rity problem and how important that problem is. The importance of a problem can be 
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determined by a risk assessment. In case of security risks, three parameters play a role 
in this assessment: threat, vulnerability and consequence [3]. Threat is the probability 
of an incident and consequence is the loss given the occurrence of an incident. In case 
the security risk includes the possibility of an attack (e.g. terrorists), vulnerability may 
refer to the probability of ‘success’.
  In this study we focus on the extent to which a common problem defi nition of the 
four security phenomena (port-related crime, threats, emergency situations, and events 
and incidents) is available that can lay the fundamental groundwork for the actions of 
different actors.
 II. Communication problem: process-related decisions at the strategic level
 Adequate communication between actors is essential for integral and integrated 
 security. Inadequate communication may lead to unawareness of problem(s) or lack 
of knowledge and/or information about measures taken by other actors with respect to 
similar security problems. Furthermore, consultation and communication between dif-
ferent actors helps in constructing shared perceptions of reality, which is benefi cial for 
a targeted approach of any problem. In this study we examine formal consultation and 
communication structures that currently exist in the port area to bring together different 
actors involved in port-security.
 III. Responsibility problem: operational decisions at actor level
 Dividing the actors’ responsibilities and competences in a transparent way, per  security 
phenomenon, is essential. If there is no clearness about this, it is possible that the prob-
lem, although it would be well defi ned and despite its handling would be discussed, is 
not dealt with. Furthermore, indistinctness regarding the competences and responsibili-
ties may lead to tensions between the actors, in turn leading to ineffi cient tackling of 
crime and security problems. Crawford [4] puts it as follows: ‘the problem of many 
Figure 1: Assessment scheme.
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hands where so many people contribute that no one contribution can be identifi ed; 
and if no person can be held accountable after the event, then no one needs to behave 
 responsibly beforehand. As authority is ‘shared’, it becomes diffi cult to disentangle and 
can become almost intangible’.
 IV. Handling problem: process-related decisions at the operational level
 An integral approach requires the actors to agree with one another on the manner to 
tackle the problem. There has to be consensus about the type of approach: pro-active, 
preventive, preparatory, reactive, curative and/or a mixed approach. Similarly, there has 
to be a clear view of how measures of one actor infl uence the effi ciency and effective-
ness of actions of other actors.
Remark that this theoretical framework can be used for any approach where an integral and 
integrated approach involving multi-actor collaborations, is desired. The assessment scheme 
can thus be used to study the security arrangements in an analytical and systematic way 
within any port area worldwide.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
As the object of this study is the description and evaluation of complex security arrangements 
in their real-life context (i.e. in the port of Antwerp), we adopted a descriptive case study 
design [5]. Data were collected in two ways: through a study of documents and through 
in-depth expert interviews. First, an extensive study of the following types of documents was 
carried out: legislation, offi cial policy documents, working documents, annual reports, 
mutual agreements, protocols, etc. Some of these documents are related to harbor security in 
general, whereas others only apply to specifi c security arrangements in the port of Antwerp. 
The study of these documents provided us with a fi rst insight into the current situation of the 
port and the ways in which the four security phenomena are currently being dealt with in the 
different parts of the port area. Second, in-depth expert interviews were conducted with 
32 respondents from 17 different public organizations that play a key role in the approach of 
at least one of the four security phenomena on which we focus in this study. A complete list 
of these organizations together with the geographical part of the port in which they operate 
can be found in Table 1.
Within every organization we aimed at interviewing two or more knowledgeable respond-
ents with expertise or experience in approaching one or more of the four security phenomena 
either at the strategic or at the operational level. Due to time and budget limitations, the 
 following organizations could not be consulted: the Belgian intelligence and security ser-
vices, the Belgian Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (OCAD) and the private (security) 
companies working in the port. However, more insight into the role of these players was 
gained through interviews with other actors and a thorough study of documents. The 
semi-structured interviews were conducted by using one general and one specifi c question-
naire, which were both sent well in advance to the respondents for them to be able to prepare 
for the interview. The general questionnaire (see Appendix) was the same for all respondents 
and consisted of three types of questions: (i) questions with respect to the general tasks, 
objectives and priorities of the respondent’s organization and the way in which these are 
approached, (ii) questions with respect to specifi c tasks, objectives and priorities in the port 
of Antwerp and the ways in which these are approached (eventually with collaboration agree-
ments) and (iii) questions with respect to integral and integrated security within the port area. 
Part 1 of the general questionnaire comprised questions of types (i) and (ii), whereas Part 2 
of the general questionnaire consisted of type (iii) questions.
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The specifi c questionnaire was customized per actor and provided the opportunity for the 
respondents to elaborate on certain viewpoints, remarks, and considerations.
The information gathered and obtained through the study of documents and the interviews 
was processed using two analyses. First, an analysis was carried out at the level of the indi-
vidual respondent. Each respondent received a detailed personal feedback report in which the 
content of the interview was summarized and organized in relation to the key themes of the 
analysis scheme (see Fig. 1). The reports were supplemented with references to relevant doc-
uments (legislation, policy documents, protocols, etc.) mentioned by the respondent during 
the interview or collected by the researchers in the fi rst phase of the research. Sometimes 
remarks made by other respondents were added to the report (e.g. in the case of contradictory 
views or information). Respondents were asked to validate this report or, if necessary, to 
make changes and/or additions. This iterative process can be considered as a form of data 
triangulation between the documents, the interview data and the interpretations of the 
researchers. In the second (and fi nal) phase, the information obtained was thematically ana-
lyzed in relation to the four above-mentioned security phenomena.
Table 1: Overview of organizations where in-depth interviews were conducted.
Organization
Number of persons 
interviewed
A. Not tied to one specifi c area within the port
1 Federal Crisis Centre (Belgian Ministry of Home Affairs) 2
2 Customs (Belgian Ministry of Finances) 1
3 Department of Mobility and Public Works – Section Harbor 
Policy (Flemish Regional Government)
1
4 Department of Mobility and Public Works – Section Pilotage 
(Flemish Regional Government)
1
5 General Directorate of the Federal Administrative Police 1
6 Federal Maritime Police, section port of Antwerp 3
7 Antwerp Municipal Port Authority 2
B. Right bank of the port area
8 Province of Antwerp 2
9 Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce, district of Antwerp 3
10 Federal Judicial Police, district of Antwerp 3
11 Federal Administrative Police, district of Antwerp 3
12 Local police, city of Antwerp 2
C. Left Bank of the port area
13 Province of Eastern-Flanders 1
14 Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce, district of Dendermonde 3
15 Federal Judicial Police, district of Dendermonde 2
16 Federal Administrative Police, district of Dendermonde 2
17 Local Police, municipality of Beveren 1
Total 32
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Figure 2 illustrates a schematic overview of the research methodology and the way our 
study is presented in this article. We obtained through the extensive literature study in com-
bination with the in-depth interviews, a picture of the current security arrangements within 
the Antwerp harbor. We then used the assessment scheme (see Fig. 1) to carry out a gap 
analysis based on the perceptions of the interviewees. In the next section, we summarize the 
main points of attention indicated by the respondents with respect to the four points of the 
assessment scheme. We mainly focus on the results and recommendations based on the gap 
analysis and provide additional background information wherever it is deemed necessary. To 
extensively describe the current arrangements in detail would make the paper unreadable and 
much too detailed.
4 RESEARCH RESULTS
4.1 Port-related crime
 I. Defi nition
 Currently, there is no unambiguous defi nition available of ‘port-related crime’ as a 
 specifi c criminal phenomenon. However, the port is often used as a ‘logistics gateway’ 
for criminal organizations to distribute certain goods (drugs, cars, waste, etc.) and/or 
people within Europe or worldwide. Furthermore, port-related crime also involves crimes 
against businesses (e.g. burglary) operating within the port area. In order to integrate the 
approach of port-related crime by the different police forces operating in the port area 
(the local police forces of Antwerp, Zwijndrecht en Beveren, the federal judicial police 
forces of Antwerp and Dendermonde and the maritime police force), this phenomenon 
needs to be carefully mapped and clearly described. This analysis could form the basis 
for the specifi cation of certain port-related criminal activities in the national and local 
security plans and, hence, a better division and coordination of tasks between the differ-
ent police forces.
 II. Communication structures
 An integral approach to crime requires the different police forces and the administrative 
authorities (mayors) and judicial authorities (public prosecutors) under which they oper-
ate to coordinate their efforts. However, the existing consultation structures required by 
law – the District Investigation Consultation Platforms (one in the judicial district of 
Antwerp and one in the judicial district of Dendermonde) and the Local Security Council 
(one in each of three municipalities of the port area) – only cover a part of the port. More-
over, a number of important services in the port such as the Customs and the 
harbormaster are not (directly) represented in every one of these communication struc-
tures, because their duties do not primarily focus on fi ghting crime. However, as these 
bodies are constantly active in the port area, they do possess a lot of very interesting 
Figure 2: Schematic overview of research methodology.
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information that might be useful for crime-fi ghting purposes. We recommend the instal-
lation of a specifi c ‘harbor security platform’ which brings together the two judicial 
authorities in the port area, the different policing bodies (federal and local), the Customs 
and the harbormaster of the Antwerp Municipal Port Authority in order to better coordi-
nate efforts in the fi ght against harbor-related crime.
  Furthermore, the information exchange between different actors is currently often 
of an informal nature and, in this respect, it is worth thinking about a more formal struc-
ture such as a shared information crossroads databank. However, the legal possibilities 
and limitations of such an exchange of information between Customs, the police and 
private companies need to be examined in more detail fi rst. Such an investigation was 
beyond the scope of this study.
 III. + IV. Responsibilities and handling.
 Approaching port-related crime in a reactive way is fi rst and foremost a task for the 
police forces (in the fi rst place the federal judicial police, but to a lesser extent also the 
criminal investigation section of the local police forces) who carry out criminal investi-
gations under the supervision of a public prosecutor or an investigating judge. In order to 
achieve a more integral approach to this type of crime, however, support and cooperation 
with other partners is indispensable. In the port, the police force’s partners are Customs 
and the harbormaster’s services and, to a lesser extent, private companies. By carrying 
out inspections in the port area, the former two can assist the police in enhancing the 
probability of criminals getting caught. The role of private companies is predominantly 
situated in the domain of situational crime prevention (e.g. protecting their properties by 
taking techno-preventive measures). A number of points for attention were identifi ed 
through the in-depth interviewing.
The Customs and the harbormaster’s services do not always have the required capacity 
and/or suffi cient time to proactively carry out inspections and patrols within the harbor area. 
In this respect, a better collaboration and the establishment of mixed teams consisting of all 
the inspection authorities that operate in the port, is often recommended. An example often 
mentioned in this case is the Expert Center Harbor in the port of Rotterdam, where several 
actors such as the seaport police, the National Crime Investigation Service and the Customs, 
work together to tackle crime in the Rotterdam port area by combining expertise and by 
 carrying out joint actions [6].
Various police services operate in the port: the maritime police, three local police corpses and 
the federal police services of two judicial districts. In order to tackle port-related crime, it is 
essential that the various police services work well together. Although the cooperation in prac-
tice is good, a number of points for attention were mentioned which could be improved upon:
1. Protocols have been signed which agree that basic policing in the port is assured by the 
maritime police, except in the municipality of Zwijndrecht (where it is assured by the 
local police of Zwijndrecht). In a large part of the port area, the maritime police (which 
is a specialized policing body) is thus taking up basic policing tasks that are normally the 
competence of the local police forces. This establishes a need for more coordination be-
tween the local police forces and the maritime police. In practice, the withdrawal of the 
local police forces from basic policing tasks in the port area has also led to a diminished 
attention for port-related crime on their behalf.
2. The maritime police has a very wide range of tasks: border control and surveillance, 
basic policing in the port, maritime policing (police patrols by boat), specialized and 
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subsidiary support to the federal and local police forces and inspection of specifi c port-
related laws and regulations. Moreover, the area which it polices, which also includes all 
navigable waterways outside of the Antwerp port, has signifi cantly grown as a result of 
the expansion of the Antwerp port. To date, the resources of the maritime police have not 
yet been adapted to refl ect this reality.
A last major challenge as regards tackling port-related crime is the collaboration and 
 distribution of tasks between the two federal judicial forces (Antwerp and Dendermonde) 
who both carry out criminal investigations in the port area under the authority of two different 
public prosecutors (Antwerp and Dendermonde). First, we can conclude from the interviews 
that the current cooperation (as regulated by a special memorandum) mainly relates to the 
distribution of operational tasks among the two federal judicial police forces. No signifi cant 
issues were mentioned by the interviewees in our study regarding this distribution of tasks. 
Nevertheless, this situation leads to an increased risk that different investigation strategies are 
developed in different parts of the port. Moreover, organizational pathologies in police intel-
ligence can arise such as duplication of information or institutional friction (the diffi culties of 
moving information across institutional boundaries). In the long term, it might be better to 
create a single police entity for the entire port in the framework of the principle of ‘unity of 
land, unity of command’. There is some discussion about how this principle should be put 
into practice, however. On the one hand, some respondents have suggested that this entity 
should be a new police entity that would be responsible for basic policing as well as for spe-
cialized policing and should also carry out administrative and judicial tasks. However, with 
respect to criminal investigations, police forces in Belgium operate under the supervision of 
a judicial authority (the public prosecutor or an investigating judge). Since the port area is 
situated in two judicial districts, this unifi ed police would still have to operate under different 
authority structures. On the other hand, this principle might also be translated as the main 
responsibility for investigating port-related crime being assigned to one federal judicial police 
service (either of Antwerp or of Dendermonde) operating under the supervision of one public 
prosecutor’s offi ce (either that of the judicial district of Antwerp or that of Dendermonde).
4.2 Threats
 I. Defi nition
 The defi nition of ‘threat’ provided by Belgian national law includes the following: espi-
onage, terrorism, extremism, proliferation, harmful sectarian organizations, criminal 
organizations and interference. Although there is currently no evidence of any threats, it 
is not inconceivable that the port and its critical infrastructure may be the object of 
threats. Threats relating to terrorism and extremism are easily thought of, but the defi ni-
tion also includes other forms of intentional acts which may disrupt or destroy the port’s 
operations based on criminal motives (hacking, or hostage situations, for example) or 
based on the tendency to maximize the number of casualties without taking cover or 
hostages.
 II. Communication structures
 An important meeting and consultation platform on maritime security is the Local Com-
mittee for Maritime Security. The port of Antwerp’s local committee on maritime security 
consists of the harbormaster of the Antwerp Municipal Port Authority (Chairman), the 
local police forces of Antwerp, Zwijndrecht and Beveren, the maritime police, Customs 
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and the National Security and Defense (Provincial Command Antwerp). This committee 
may be expanded in order to obtain an integral and integrated approach. For example, the 
platform should seek collaboration with the consultation platforms for emergency 
 planning, i.e. the municipal or provincial safety cells (see section 4.3). This has already 
partially been carried out given that a number of the committee’s members are also rep-
resented in these safety cells. However, a number of authorities and services which have 
an important role to play in the decision-making process for certain administrative and 
judicial measures in the fi eld, still do not have representation (e.g. the mayor and the 
Public Prosecutor). In order to be representative of the entire port, a representation or link 
with the competent actors in the Province of Eastern-Flanders and/or the judicial district 
of Dendermonde must also be achieved.
 III. + IV. Responsibilities and handling
 Similar to port-related crime, threats require predominantly not only preventative and 
reactive measures but also proactive ones. The fi rst two measures focus on controlling 
the actual threat. The preventative aspect has been developed in more detail as a result of 
the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (or ISPS Code). Following the 
transposition of this code into an EU Directive, private companies have drafted security 
plans based on risk analyses, with all kinds of measures designed to protect and secure 
their port facilities and often their entire site. The EU Directive ensures that there are also 
measures in place designed to secure the port as a whole. The new legislation in the 
framework of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection stimulates the 
preventative aspect and primarily places responsibility for it with the operator. There are, 
however, still a few points for attention in the preventative measures:
1. In the fi rst place, further thought and increased investments are needed with regard to the 
digitalization of the information contained in the security plans. However, it is important 
to work with the existing databases as much as possible and to ensure that we will not 
be confronted in the long term with parallel databases that are not compatible with one 
another. This latter problem has been described by Sheptycki [7] as ‘digital divide’.
2. Secondly, it is recommended that the security plans tie in as much as possible with 
the emergency and intervention plans and/or that they are coordinated with them. This 
 coordination will not be an easy task given that both plans are being developed based on 
different philosophies but also because the security plans of the ports and the port facili-
ties are strictly confi dential. Certain steps towards a rapprochement are being taken, but 
this continues to be a point of attention. In terms of information management, it would 
be interesting to coordinate both plans more and to gather them in a secured crossroads 
databank.
3. Thirdly, continuing to work on raising the awareness of port security personnel via  training 
or through educational courses is needed.
The reactive approach comprises all the measures relating to threat management when a 
threat becomes real and/or is actually carried out. The general consensus is that these  measures 
are suffi ciently in line with the principles and structures for the handling of emergencies (see 
also section 4.3) in view of the fact that the response undoubtedly also requires administrative 
measures.
In order to achieve an integral approach, it is essential to continue to invest in the develop-
ment of measures which contribute to the early detection of threats. As with port-related 
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crime, the success or failure of this proactive approach depends on the development of an 
effective information status and exchange. At the federal level, the anti-terrorism unit OCAD 
is responsible for evaluating the information supplied by various services such as the intelli-
gence and security services, the federal and local police and the Customs. In order to continue 
to better develop this information status, it is however also important that information is 
gathered in private companies. The Early Warning System (EWS) already contributes to this 
goal. The EWS is a public-private information network at the national level where private 
companies are encouraged to report suspect behavior and events to the local police. It was set 
up by the police in collaboration with the Federation of Enterprises in Belgium. Such initia-
tives are also being taken and proposed at the local level.
Various authorities and services are involved in protecting the port against threats. The 
harbormaster as well as other bodies such as the maritime police and Customs signifi cantly 
contribute to stimulating, developing and maintaining preventative protection and security 
measures in the port. In order to ensure that the threat-oriented approach (with an emphasis 
on protection and security) is completed with a cause-oriented approach (tracking down per-
petrators and investigating phenomena), a more far-reaching integration of the administrative 
and judicial processes of the police services is required. This, however, is more of a point for 
attention at the national level. An important point for attention in terms of the division of 
competences is the manner in which the local authorities and services will organize  themselves 
when confronted with a threat that becomes real.
4.3 Emergency situations
 I. Defi nition
 What constitutes an ‘emergency situation’ is unambiguously defi ned by Belgian national 
law and therefore similar for all actors within the port area: ‘each event which has 
(or could have) damaging consequences for societal life, such as a serious disruption of 
public security, a serious treat for the health and life of persons, or a serious treat for 
material interests, and which necessitates a coordination of different emergency services 
to neutralize the treat or to limit its consequences’. Hence, the interviewed experts did 
not mention a defi nition problem for this security phenomenon.
 II. Communication structures
 In the port of Antwerp, two provincial safety cells (one in Antwerp and one in 
 Eastern-Flanders) and three municipal safety cells (in Antwerp, in Zwijndrecht and in 
Beveren) are responsible to prepare emergency situations. They constitute platforms 
where different actors who are concerned with safety communicate and consult together. 
The composition of these safety cells is determined by Belgian national law. The follow-
ing actors have to be represented in each safety cell: the mayor and the municipal civil 
servant responsible for emergency planning (in the municipal safety cell) or the governor 
and the provincial civil servant responsible for emergency planning (in the provincial 
safety cell), a representative of the fi re brigade, a representative of the police, a person 
representing medical and psychosocial services, a person responsible for logistic 
 assistance and a person responsible for information/communication. Besides these 
legally determined actors, in Eastern-Flanders, as well as in Antwerp, the provincial 
safety cells are complemented with other public services and private companies. 
 However, only in the Antwerp provincial safety cell, explicit representation is present 
from the maritime police, the Customs and the municipal port company. In the 
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 Eastern-Flanders safety cell, the left bank part of the harbor is represented by the fi re 
brigade commander of Beveren, the local police of Beveren, the head of the federal judi-
cial police of Dendermonde and the private company Ashland.
  In view of the expansion of the harbor area at the left bank of the river Scheldt, it 
would be preferable (according to the interviewees) to include direct representation of 
certain harbor actors, such as the harbor captain, in the provincial consultations of 
 Eastern-Flanders regarding emergency planning. However – and similar to what we sug-
gested above in the case of port-related crime (see section 4.1) – a cross-border 
consultation structure covering the whole port area should be considered.
III. Responsibilities
 Our study revealed the following items of consideration, concerning the collaboration 
between different actors and their responsibilities in emergency situations.
  Although the leadership of police operations during emergency situations is legally 
arranged, these activities are often seen as insuffi ciently fl exible and adaptable to the 
specifi c complex context of the port area. Collaboration between police services is locally 
arranged more in depth, and the arrangements differ between the left bank and the right 
bank. For example, the maritime police takes up a leading role during emergency situa-
tions on the left bank (because they are more familiar with the port area than the local 
police or the federal judicial police operating on the left bank), but an operational role 
during emergency situations on the right bank (where the chief constable of the local 
police of Antwerp or the head of the federal judical police of Antwerp take up the leading 
roles). One possible solution to these differing arrangements within the same port area 
which was suggested by some respondents is to install one police service responsible for 
the entire port area, a ‘harbor police’. However, police forces in Belgium operate under 
the supervision of a judicial (the public prosecutor) or administrative authority (the 
mayor). Since the port area is situated in three municipalities (three mayors) and two 
judicial districts (two public prosecutors), this unifi ed harbor police would still have to 
operate under different authority structures. The assignment of a unifi ed ‘harbor police’ 
to one authority structure is politically sensitive and therefore diffi cult to realize.
  The division of competences and capacities between different administrations and 
services as regards preparation for, and management of, emergency situations located on 
some border, or having an impact on areas being subject to other administrations or ser-
vices, can be noticed. Such cross-border emergency situations are, however, very realistic 
in the Antwerp harbor area. Regarding preparatory actions, different actors need to be 
aware of each other’s procedures and means, and ideally, the procedures and means are 
identical. Furthermore, common emergency plans for the left bank and the right bank 
would be recommendable, since uniform procedures and emergency exercises, as well as 
identical communication protocols, etc., would lower the likelihood of mistakes and mis-
communications, and it would increase the quality of the emergency plans (resulting 
from continuous improvement of the uniform plan). An option to solve the (potential) 
cross-border problems (due to miscommunication, non-transparent responsibilities, etc.) 
is to assign a ‘pilot-governor’ who is in charge of cross-provincial emergency situations.
IV. Handling
 Belgian national legislation offers a clear framework as regards the handling of emer-
gency situations. An integral way of dealing with emergency situations in the port area is 
explicitly encouraged and is translated into a risk cycle. Within this cycle, mainly the 
preparatory measures (risk identifi cation activities and the elaboration of emergency 
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plans and procedures) and the reactive measures (management and control of emergency 
situations) are concretely worked out. In the reactive phase, the general principle holds 
that the management is handled at the most appropriate level. Three possible levels exist: 
the municipal, the provincial and the federal (national) level. The management of an 
emergency situation at the municipal or provincial level is carried out by an operational 
coordination structure or a so-called CP-Ops and an administrative coordination struc-
ture or a so-called CC. The CP-Ops is headed by an operational leader (fi re brigade 
commander, municipal police or medical doctor, depending on the emergency situation 
at hand), whereas the CC is headed by the mayor or the governor. Managing an emer-
gency situation at the national level has its own structure with an evaluation cell, a policy 
cell, and an information cell. An emergency situation at the port can become the respon-
sibility of the national level when, for instance, two or more provinces are involved, 
when there are so many victims or when there is so much danger in a large area that the 
need arises to inform the entire Belgian population. To prevent the occurrence of emer-
gency situations, investments in prevention measures are essential, for example suffi cient 
controls on existing regulations. Several interviewees mentioned that more attention 
needs to be devoted to curative measures, i.e. all measures needed to return to normal 
circumstances. Although the preparatory and reactive measures are worked out suffi -
ciently in detail, our in-depth interviewing results indicate that certain challenges remain, 
such as a legally obliged framework for internal emergency plans (which are emergency 
plans of individual companies), applicable to all companies (and not only to Seveso com-
panies as is currently the case), or such as the alignment and optimization of traffi c 
circulation plans of the left bank and right bank of the harbor area.
4.4 Events and incidents
 I. Defi nition
 There seems to be no confusion between and among the interviewees about the defi nition 
of events and incidents. In the port area, large traffi c accidents and major accidents are 
important examples of ‘sudden and unexpected events which require immediate and 
coordinated onsite policing’. As far as planned events which might jeopardize public 
order, safety and/or health, the examples are more varied. These include small-scale 
(e.g. the visit of a VIP) or large-scale (e.g. festivals) events, as well as strikes or demon-
strations, whether they attract a large crowd or not.
 II. Communication structures
 Planned events and demonstrations are managed with coordination meetings (which are 
organized by provincial administrations) in which all the relevant actors (municipality, 
local police force, public prosecutor, emergency services, etc.) including the event organ-
izer, are represented. During these meetings, the risks are mapped, several scenarios are 
developed and agreements are made in terms of police and civilian security (and safety). 
These coordination meetings are also used to make agreements between the administra-
tive (mayor) and judicial authorities (public prosecutor) when judicial action (such as a 
police report or an arrest) might be necessary. However, these agreements should be 
more clearly communicated beforehand to all the parties involved and should also be 
documented (e.g. included in the events plans). In Antwerp, a specifi c consultation plat-
form has been established to this end: the so-called Advisory Group on Event Safety and 
Security. The agreements and principles are in line with the structure of the emergency 
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plans given that the members of the Advisory Group are virtually the same actors that 
have been appointed to the municipal safety cell (see above) and that this group also 
reports to this cell.
III. + IV. Responsibilities and handling
 With regards to events management, the principles of emergency and intervention 
 planning are also applied to the agreements in terms of police and civilian security during 
planned events. The principle of negotiated management is applied for the management 
of incidents and events and starts from the premise of the protection and management of 
events and/or large crowds. The emphasis is also laid on an integral approach with atten-
tion to protection, prevention, de-escalation (with possible regulation and repression) 
and aftercare.
As is the case with emergency planning, a variety of actors are involved in the management 
of incidents and events. Generally, they cooperate well according to the interviewees. Our 
qualitative study reveals the following main points of interest:
1. The administrative authorities are responsible for ensuring public order. Generally, as is 
the case in the port, this is the task of the municipal authorities (the mayor). However, 
since the port area is located in three municipalities, there should be suffi cient commu-
nication and consultation to prevent the various municipal administrations from issuing 
contradicting regulations or measures.
2. Police are responsible for implementing these measures according to the principles of 
negotiated management. Generally speaking, the police cooperation between the various 
police forces in the port (local police, maritime police, federal judicial and administra-
tive police) is smooth, and for the time being no signifi cant issues have been identifi ed. 
It is worth noting that the maritime police’s role varies, depending on whether they are 
operating on the left or right bank, as is the case in emergencies (see section 4.3).
3. It is not inconceivable that an event may take place in the entire port (e.g. a general 
strike or the visit of a VIP). The police usually assigns this task to the head of the fed-
eral judicial police, but the chief constable of the local police may also be in charge of 
coordinating and leading operations. This assignment occurs on a case-by-case basis, in 
consultation with the other authorities and services. Up until now this has always gone 
well and formalization was not considered a necessity.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Four security phenomena were investigated in the Port of Antwerp area in Belgium: (i) port- 
related crime, (ii) threats, (iii) emergency situations and (iv) events and incidents. For each of 
these phenomena, administrative, authority, judicial and police arrangements were studied 
through qualitative research. Our study started from the premise that the ways in which these 
multi-actor arrangements tackle each of the four security phenomena should be suffi ciently 
integral and integrated. We conceptualized four conditions (defi nition, communication, 
responsibilities and handling) that have to be taken into account when implementing such an 
integral and integrated approach. Then we used a case study design – combining two main 
data collections methods (study of relevant documents and qualitative interviews with 
experts) – to examine the extent to which these conditions are currently met in the Port of 
Antwerp, and how, if necessary, improvements could be made. Our results indicate that pres-
ent arrangements can be largely improved, both within the existing setting as out of current 
administrative, authority, judicial and police boundaries of competence and responsibility.
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Within the existing setting, making arrangements more uniform and transparent for all 
actors, a rearrangement of the tasks and responsibilities of maritime police, together with 
more intensive collaboration, communication and information exchange between different 
parties in security matters, seems to be the most important recommendation. If thinking out 
of the existing settings and not taking into account existing legislation, we recommend to 
establish the port of Antwerp area as one separate region with a single administrative, author-
ity, judicial and police boundary. Within such a region, a crisis manager may be responsible 
for emergency planning issues, while competences and responsibilities of authorities and 
judicial and police services are also made uniform and according to the ‘unity of land, unity 
of command’ principle.
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APPENDIX: GENERAL QUESTIONNAIRE.
Part 1: Current state of affairs
1.1 General objectives and tasks of the organization
 – What are the most important objectives and tasks of your organization?
 –  What are the most important priorities of your organization? What are the most 
important problems your organization is currently being confronted with? Are those 
new or old problems?
 – How are these priorities and problems being approached?
 –  Which other actors or organizations do you collaborate with? Are these new or old 
collaborations?
1.2 Specifi c objectives and tasks related to the port area
 –  
To what extent are the objectives and tasks of your organization related to the port 
of Antwerp?
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 –  
To what extent are the priorities and problems of your organization related to the port?
 – 
How are these port-related priorities and problems being approached?
 –  
Which other actors or organizations do you collaborate with to approach port- 
related priorities and problems?
Part 2: Integral and integrated security
 – 
 Which security phenomena in the port of Antwerp defi nitely need to be approached 
in a more integrated and integral way according to you?
 – 
 What does such an integral and integrated approach ideally look like? How can 
security phenomena in the port be approached in a better way?
 – 
 What are the most important conditions that need to be fulfi lled in order to arrive at 
a truly integral and integrated approach?
 – 
 What are currently the most important problems, obstacles or barriers that stifl e the 
implementation of an integral and integrated approach of security phenomena in 
the port (with respect to the defi nition of problems, communication and division of 
responsibilities between different actors, handling)?
 – 
 Which actors or organizations need to be more involved in the approach of security 
phenomena in the port?
